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Weinman: Weinman: Supervision Liability

Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983: Searching for the Deep Pocket
A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS

I. INTRODUCTION
Suits under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are complex. To the practitioner who
does not often litigate in the civil rights area, section 1983 may seem a
confusing hybrid of constitutional law and tort law. One of the important
preliminary issues the practitioner must decide is who to include as a
defendant. Section 1983's theory of constitutional wrongdoing without
vicarious liability will seem strange to some practitioners. There are
circumstances, however, in which a plaintiff may sue the supervisor of the
person who immediately inflicted the injury. This Comment examines the
intricacies of supervisory liability as determined by recent United States
Supreme Court and circuit court decisions and provides pointers to practitioners. In addition, this Comment suggests an amendment to section 1983.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE SECTION 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code' provides a mechanism for individuals to recover damages for the violation of constitutional
rights. Congress enacted the section as a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
which was designed to enforce the recently adopted fourteenth amendment. 2

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22,
§ 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1,
93 Stat. 1284 (1979)). It currently reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be
a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
2. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTES LITIGATION 2-7 (2d ed.
1986).
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During the first 90 years of its existence, relatively few cases were
brought under section 1983.'
In 1961, however, the Supreme Court
invigorated section 1983 with its decision in Monroe v. Pape.4 Monroe
involved a suit by an African-American family against the City of Chicago
and 13 police officers for the violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights.5
Monroe held that the existence of a state law remedy did not preclude the
federal claim. "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked.'6 The Court clarified the meaning of "under color of state law,"
which it construed in an earlier decision as "'[m]isuse of power, possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed7
with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."'
The Court dismissed the claim against the City of Chicago because it found
that Congress did not intend to make a municipality a "person" under section
1983.8 The Court held, however, that the complaint should not have been
dismissed against the individual officers.9 As a result of this decision, section
1983 would become the principal means by which plaintiffs could hold
governmental officials accountable for the deprivation of constitutional rights.

3. Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move From Constitution To Tort, 77
GEo. L. J. 1719 (1989). According to the author, the reason for the lack of litigation
under section 1983 was the interpretation of the words "under color of state law."
Until Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), an act committed in violation of state law
was not considered to be under color of state law. Id. at 172. See infra note 4 and
accompanying text.
4. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
5. The petitioners were an African-American family with six children. Id. at 169-

70. The complaint alleged that 13 Chicago police officers broke into the petitioners'
home early in the morning, without either an arrest warrant or a search warrant. Id.
at 169. The police officers allegedly made the whole family stand naked in the living
room, while they ransacked every room in the house, emptied drawers, and cut open
mattress covers. Id. Further, the petitioners alleged that Mr. Monroe was taken to the
police station and detained there for ten hours while he was interrogated about a recent
murder. Id. Monroe allegedly was not taken before a magistrate, even though one
was available. Id. He was not permitted to call either an attorney or his family. Id.
Monroe was subsequently released without being charged with any crime. Id.
6. Id. at 183.
7. Id. at 184, 187. It had been argued that actions in violation of state law could
not be considered "under color of' state law. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 74.
8. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. This part of the decision was later overturned by
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See infra notes 14-18
and accompanying text.
9. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
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III. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR NOT ALLOWED UNDER SECTION 1983
A victim deprived of constitutional rights ordinarily desires to include as
a defendant more than just the person who directly caused the injury. In
many cases, a state or local governmental employee caused the deprivation,1"
and substantial monetary damages are involved.1 Although section 1983 is
a hybrid of tort and constitutional law, 12 the plaintiff cannot use respondeat
superior13 to seek a defendant with the ability to pay a damage award. In
Monell v. Department of Social Services,14 the Court overruled Monroe in
part.' 5 The issues in Monell centered on the liability of the local governmental entity; however, the Court stated that respondeatsuperiorwas not 6available
to permit suing either the local governmental entity or supervisors.1
In Monell, female employees of the Department of Social Services
("Department") and the Board of Education of New York City ("Board")
brought a class action against the Department and its Commissioner, the Board
and its Chancellor, and the city and its mayor. The individual defendants
were sued only in their official capacities." The plaintiffs alleged that the
Board and the Department had "as a matter of official policy compelled
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were
required for medical reasons."'18

10. For example, police officers and prison guards are common section 1983
defendants.
11. For example, damage to someone's health or business is a common injury.
12. See Nahmod, supra note 3, at 1720.
13. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-253 (1965) on the
liability of masters for torts committed by their servants in the scope of employment.
14. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
15. Id. at 663. See also infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. The
prohibition of the use of respondeatsuperiorhad generally been the rule in the circuits
before Monell. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 338. See also Duchesne v.
Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.

1977); Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Draeger v. Grand Cent., Inc.,
504 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1974); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973);
Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971).
16. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; S.NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 167.
17. Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61.
18. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the city of New York had a policy
of forcing women to take maternity leave after the fifth month of pregnancy unless a
city physician and the head of the employees' agency allowed up to an additional two
months of work. Id. at 661. The defendants stated that they changed this policy
before the institution of the suit. Id. The plaintiffs further alleged, however, that the
leaveRepository,
after the seventh
Boardby
hadUniversity
a policy ofofrequiring
Published
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari 9 to consider whether local
governmental officials sued in their official capacity and/or local school
boards are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.20 The Court held
that Monroe v. Pape2' was overruled insofar as it held that a municipality

was not a "person" under section 1983.'
The Court outlined a detailed examination of the legislative history
involved in the adoption of section 1983.' Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan concluded that, "Congress did intend municipalities and other local
government units to be included among those persons to whom section 1983
applies." 24 The Court held that local governmental officials who are sued in
their official capacities are "persons" under section 1983 in cases where a
local governmental entity would be liable in its own name.? Local
governmental entities may be sued under section 1983 where "the action
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers."26 Additionally, this liability extends to situations where the
constitutional deprivation occurs as a result of a governmental "custom," even
though that custom has not received formal approval from the government's
official decision making body.27
The Court went on to explain that Congress only intended municipalities
to be held liable when action taken pursuant to official municipal policy
caused a constitutional tort.2s The Court noted, however, that "a municipality
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor or, in other words,

of pregnancy unless that month fell within the last month of the school year. In that
case, the teacher could remain through the end of the school year. Id. at 661 n.2.
19. 429 U.S. 1071 (1977).
20. Monell, 436 U.S. at 662.
21. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
22. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. The Court, however, upheld Monroe "insofar as it
holds that the doctrine of respondeat superioris not a basis for rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of their employees." Id. at 663 n.7.
The Court discussed this holding in greater detail later in the opinion.
23. Id. at 665-89.
24. Id. at 690 (italics in original).
25. Id. at 690 n.55.
26. Id. at 690. Note that in reality, this basis of liability is extremely narrow, as
most municipal entities do not officially adopt unconstitutional policies. The great
number of section 1983 claims occur when governmental officers cause a constitutional
violation through actions unsanctioned by any official policy. See infra notes 32-38
and accompanying text.
27. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
28. Id.
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a municipality cannot
be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat
9
theory."2
superior
After Monell, a local government may not be sued under section 1983 for
a constitutional deprivation inflicted solely by its employees or agents.
Liability exists only when the execution of a government's policy or custom
inflicts the injury. 0 In Monell, the Court upheld liability against the
governmental entities because an official policy was responsible for the
constitutional violation.'
Subsequent interpretation of the requirements for liability under section
1983 by the Supreme Court and courts of appeal have further confused the
issue of supervisory liability. The remainder of this Comment will examine
theories of supervisory liability under section 1983 in situations where federal
courts addressed the issue.
IV. SUING SUPERVISORS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY
A plaintiff may name a supervisor as a defendant either in the supervisor's personal capacity or official capacity. The Supreme Court addressed
the differences between personal capacity and official capacity suits in
Kentucky v. Graham." The case involved an award of legal fees under 42
U.S.C. section 1988 resulting from a section 1983 claim.3 Writing for the

29. Id. (italics in original). The Court cited the original language of section 1983
which stated, "shall subject or cause to be subjected," which, in the Court's view,
cannot be read to include vicarious liability. In addition, the Court was unwilling to
create a federal law of respondeatsuperior. Id. at 691-94.
30. Id. at 694. The Court said earlier in the opinion that suits against governmental officials in their official capacities should be considered as if the suit were against
the governmental entity itself. Id. at 690 n.55.
31. Id. at 694-95.
32. 473 U.S. 159 (1985).

33. The suit dealt with the illegal search, beating, and false arrest of the members
of the family of Clyde Graham, who was suspected of killing a Kentucky state trooper.
Id. at 160. The police had entered Graham's father's house, without a warrant, to look
for Graham. Id. Graham was not there, but six members of his family were. Id.
They were abused by the police, and subsequently brought the suit. Id. An
investigation by the Kentucky Attorney General's office concluded that the police had
used excessive force and that a "complete breakdown" in police discipline had created
an "uncontrolled" situation. Id. at 161.
The plaintiffs sued various local and state law enforcement officers, the city of
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, Hardin County, Kentucky, and the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. Id. Kenneth Brandenburg, Commissioner bf the state police, was named
as a defendant, "individually and as Commissioner of the Bureau of State Police." Id.
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majority, Justice Marshall started with the notion that personal capacity suits
"seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he

takes under color of state law."' In contrast, official capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent."35 The official capacity suit is not against the
supervisor personally because the real party in interest is the governmental
entity. An award of damages against the supervisor in his personal capacity
may be executed only against the supervisor's personal assets, while damages
awarded in an official capacity suit must be paid by the governmental
entity.'
To establish personal liability in a section 1983 action, the plaintiff need
only show that the supervisor, acting under color of state law, caused the
deprivation of a constitutional right.37 The plaintiff must prove more in an
official capacity action. Because the suit is really against the governmental
entity, the entity is liable only when the entity itself is a "moving force"

The district court dismissed the case against the Commonwealth of Kentucky on
eleventh amendment grounds. Id. The case was settled. Id. at 162. The respondents
moved under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) for the Commonwealth to pay their attorney
fees. Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title; title IX of Public Law 92-318, or
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as a part of the costs....

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
The district court granted the attorney fees, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Graham, 473 U.S. at 162. The issue confronting the Supreme Court was whether the
Commonwealth could be compelled to pay the attorney fees when the plaintiff prevails
in a suit against a governmental employee acting in his personal capacity. Id. at 16163. The Court found the case to be a personal-capacity one. As a result, the plaintiffs
could not collect damages from the Commonwealth. The Court reversed the award of
attorney fees. Id. at 168-69.
34. Id. at 159.
35. Id. at 165. The language about official capacity suits was taken from Monell,
436 U.S. at 690 n.55.
36. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Justice Marshall noted that in a personal capacity
suit, if the official dies before the case is resolved, the plaintiff would have to pursue
the action against the official's estate. In contrast, in the official capacity suit, if the
named official dies or is replaced, the official's successor in office will be automatically substituted as the defendant. Id. at 166 n.11. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d); FED.
R. App. P. 43(c)(1).
37. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
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behind the violation. 38 The plaintiff must show that the entity's "policy or
custom" played a part in the deprivation of constitutional rights.39
In a personal capacity suit, the supervisors may be able to assert the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The officials would have to prove
that they reasonably relied on existing law as a justification for their action.
In contrast, the affirmative defense is unavailable in official capacity suits.
The only types of immunity that may be raised in an official capacity suit are
forms of sovereign immunity that the government could raise itself, such as
the eleventh amendment for states.4°
Justice Marshall went on to hold in Graham that "it is clear that a suit
against a government official in his or her personal capacity cannot lead to
imposition of fee liability upon the governmental entity."41 The victory is
against the individual official, not the entity that employs the official. The
entity is not even a party to the personal capacity suit; the entity has no right
to present a defense unless a cause of action is raised against the entity
specifically.42

The distinction between personal and official capacity suits is important
because the plaintiff's case is more difficult in the official capacity suit. The

plaintiff must meet the requisites of Monell, just as if the plaintiff were suing
the municipality. The cases are often not clear if the plaintiff is suing the
supervisor in a personal or official capacity. In addition, theories of liability
are used interchangeably between the two types of suits, leading to even more
confusion.

A. Individual Participation
Supervisors may be held liable under section 1983 if they participate in
the events causing the constitutional deprivation. 44 The supervisors may
actually be involved in the constitutional injury, or the supervisors may

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 166-67.
41. Id. at 167.
42. Id. at 167-68.
43. See infra notes 101-107 and accompanying text. For example, failure to train
or supervise can be a theory of liability against a police chief in both his individual
capacity and in his official capacity if the failure leads to a "policy or custom" of
deprivations. A general rule of thumb seems to be that whenever Monell itself or
Monell's buzzwords, "policy or custom" are mentioned, the court is discussing an
official capacity case.
44. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642,646 (9th Cir. 1989); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d
736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988).
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authorize employees to act in an unconstitutional manner.4 There must be
a causal connection between the supervisors' actions and the constitutional
violation. 46
In Specht v. Jensen47 the Tenth Circuit affirmed supervisory liability.
The plaintiffs were a husband and wife who sued three members of a
municipal police department for an unlawful search of their home and
business. 48 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment on a jury's verdict
against the supervisor because there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding of direct participation by the supervisor. 9
Although active participation in a constitutional deprivation will make the
supervisor liable under section 1983, the Seventh Circuit has held that failure
to stop an unconstitutional act will not make the supervisor liable. In Cyngar
v. Chicago, ° police officers sued the mayor and the executive director of the
city, alleging racial and political discrimination in their transfer out of the
Office of Municipal Investigation.5 ' The court of appeals upheld a directed
verdict for the mayor because he had not actually participated in the
transfers.5 2 The mayor's failure to stop the transfers was not enough for
section 1983 liability. The court noted that

45. Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1988) (supervisory
liability as to deputy not allowed because no evidence connected him to the
misconduct or showed him to have authorized the conduct).
46. Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646; Lewis, 855 F.2d at 738.
47. 832 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1987).
48. The plaintiffs sued a police supervisor, a former (at the time of the incident)
police officer and an officer who was off duty on medical leave at the time of the
incident. Id. at 1518-19. The officers illegally searched the plaintiffs' office and
home while helping a creditor execute an order to repossess a computer. Id. at 151920.
49. Id. at 1524.
50. 865 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1989).
51. The Office was an elite force of police detectives who were chosen on the
basis of experience and performance records. Id. at 831. The officers who were
transferred out of the office were Caucasian. Id. The executive director was AfricanAmerican. Id. This case occurred just after Harold Washington's election as mayor
of Chicago and reflects the executive director's goal of making the Office more
racially balanced. Id. Before the transfer, 28 of the 32 officers were white males;
after the transfers, the numbers dropped to 15 of 32. Id. at 831-32.
52. Id. at 847. The executive director had written a memo to the mayor's chief
of staff stating his intention to alter the racial make up of the office. Id. at 835. Other
than these memos, the mayor's office had no contact with the incident. Id. After the
transfers were ordered, the executive director wrote the mayor another memo stating
that the racial composition of the office had been changed. Id. at 835-36.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
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[F]ailure to take corrective action cannot in and of itself violate 1983.
Otherwise the action of an inferior officer would automatically be attributed
up the line to his highest supervision and thence to the local government,
since the misconduct of policy making officials... is attributed to the
government. 53
The court found that imposing liability on the mayor in this situation would
be inconsistent with Monell.5 4

B. Failureto Supervise or Train Employees
One way around the unavailability of respondeatsuperioris to maintain
a personal capacity suit against supervisory officials on the grounds that the
officials failed to adequately supervise or train their employees.5 5 The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the parameters of this
theory in Haynesworth v. Miller.5 6 The court said it was "well established"
that a government officer may be held liable under section 1983 for
constitutional wrongs caused by her failure to adequately train subordinates. 7

53. Id. at 847. See also Jones v. Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)
(supervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and prevent subordinates'
misconduct are not liable; superiors must "know about the conduct and facilitate it,
approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they see" to be liable).
54. Cyngar, 865 F.2d at 847.
55. See, e.g., Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussion
of maintenance of a section 1983 cause of action against police chief on a failure to
supervise theory). See also cases cited at Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1259 n.110. It
seems that the burden of proving failure to supervise is high; the theory is often plead,
but seldom won. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. Also, the failure to
supervise theory is very similar to the "policy or custom" theory discussed supra notes
30-31 and accompanying text.
56. 820 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The case dealt with a retaliatory prosecution.
The court found that section 1983 did not apply because the act occurred in the
District of Columbia prior to the 1979 amendment to section 1983 that brought the
District under the coverage of section 1983. Id. at 1246-50. The court, however, used
a section 1983 analysis. Id.
57. Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1259. All the courts of appeals that have addressed
the issue have found that a failure to train can create section 1983 liability. See Spell
v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1389-91 (4th Cir. 1987); Warren v. City of Lincoln,
Neb., 816 F.2d 1254, 1262-63 (8th Cir. 1987); Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806
F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968, 974 (1st
Cir. 1986); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, N.Y., 783 F.2d 319, 326-27 (2d Cir. 1986);
Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 774 F.2d 1495, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1985); Rock v.
McCoy, 763 F.2d 394, 397-98 (10th Cir. 1985); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220,
227-28 (5th Cir 1983); Hays v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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The court noted that this type of responsibility on the part of the official was
not premised on vicarious liability.58
The District of Columbia Circuit examined the elements that a plaintiff
must prove to prevail on the failure to supervise theory. First, the plaintiff
must prove that the official had an obligation to supervise or train the
wrongdoer5 9 Second, the plaintiff must show that the official breached this
duty. 60 Third, the plaintiff must prove that this breach was the cause of the
injury. 6 Even though these elements mirror a simple negligence action, the
court found that "something more than mere negligence on the part of the
supervisor is necessary" under Rizzo v. Goode.62 The injured party must
establish that the supervising official was either "grossly negligent" or
"deliberately indifferent" in failing to take precautions against the constitutional violation.63
The Supreme Court recently ruled in City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris4
on the plaintiff's burden of proof as to the standard of care in failure to
supervise cases. The Court dealt with the failure to train claim as it related

1982).
Two other courts of appeals have not expressly adopted this theory of section
1983 liability, but they seem to have implicitly endorsed it. See Colbum v. Upper
Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 672-73 (3d Cir. 1988); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d
874, 885-87 (7th Cir. 1983).
The Supreme Court recently ruled on this issue in City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 381 (1989). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see City of Canton,
489 U.S. at 387 n.6. See also infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
58. Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1259.
59. Id. at 1260.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1260 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)).
The issue of how negligent the supervisory official must be is a reoccurring one
in section 1983 cases, no matter which theory the plaintiff uses as a basis for
supervisory liability. Some cases seem to say that gross negligence on the part of the
supervisor is enough; others seem to require more than gross negligence. Still others
talk about imposing liability on what the supervisor should have known (i.e. that the
supervisor should have found out about the abuses and remedied them). The last
definition seems to be a reasonableness standard, which sounds much like simple
negligence. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
63. Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1260. Here, the court found that gross negligence
on the part of the official may have been enough; however, a recent Supreme Court
case changed the standard of fault to "deliberate indifference" for failure to supervise
cases. For a discussion of the "deliberate indifference" standard, see infra notes 57-64
and accompanying text for a discussion of the City of Canton case.
64. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
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to municipal liability because the defendants were sued in their official
capacities.65 The standard of care, however, probably would be the- same in
personal capacity cases.6
Geraldine Harris was arrested by officers of the Canton Police Depart-

ment. She sued the city and its officials under section 1983 alleging that she
was not provided with medical attention while in police custody.67 At trial
the jury found for Harris on the section 1983 claim.6 The court of appeals
held that there had been no error in submitting the "failure to train" theory to

the jury. 69 The court of appeals, however, reversed the judgment for Harris
and remanded the case for a new trial because it found that "certain aspects
of the District Court's jury instructions might have led the jury to believe that
70
it could find against the city on a mere respondeat superior theory."
Because the jury's verdict did not state the specific basis on which it ruled for
Harris, the court of appeals ordered a new trial. 71 The city petitioned for
certiorari arguing that the Sixth Circuit's holding was "an impermissible
broadening of municipal liability under section 1983."72

65. See infra notes 108-154 for a discussion of the official capacity cases.
66. The Court did n~t say this specifically, but the language the Court adopted
was already used by several circuits. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 381.
67. Id. Harris was brought to the police station in a patrol wagon; when she
arrived at the police station, she was sitting on the floor of the wagon. Id. Police
officers asked her if she needed medical attention. She responded with an incoherent
remark. Id. When she was brought inside, she slumped to the floor twice, and the
officers left her on the floor to prevent her from falling down again. Id. No one
summoned medical attention for Harris. Id. After an hour, the police released Harris
from custody. Id. She was then taken to the hospital in an ambulance provided by
her family. Id. At the hospital, Harris was diagnosed as suffering from "several
emotional ailments;" she was hospitalized for one week and underwent outpatient
treatment for an additional year after she was released. Id.
68. Id. at 382. Harris also brought other constitutional and state law claims
against the city and its officials; the jury rejected all but the section 1983 claim. Id.
69. Id. at 383. The court of appeals held that "a municipality is liable for failure
to train its police force, [where] the plaintiff ...prove[s] that the municipality acted
recklessly, intentionally, or with gross negligence." Id. at 382. In addition, the court
of appeals stated that the plaintiff must also prove "that the lack of training was so
reckless or grossly negligent that deprivations of person's constitutional rights were
substantially certain to result." Id. at 383. Construing the evidence in a light favorable
to Harris could have led to a jury finding that the city "'had a custom or policy of
vesting complete authority with the police supervisor of when medical treatment would
be administered to prisoners."' Id. at 382 (quoting the unpublished district court
opinion).
70. Id. at 378.
71. Id. at 383.
72. Id. at 385.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 4

1052

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Because the case involved municipal liability, the Court's first inquiry
was whether there was a direct causal link between a municipal policy or

custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.73 The Court examined the

alleged failure to train as a policy of failing to train police officers that

resulted in the denial of medical care.74 The Court concluded that there are
"limited circumstances in which an allegation of a 'failure to train' can be the

basis for municipal liability under section 1983."

5

Second, the Court observed that even though the circuits agreed that a
failure to train may be a basis for liability under section 1983,76 the circuits
disagreed on what degree of fault rendered the municipality (and the
supervising officials sued in their official capacity) liable.77 The Court held
that the inadequacy of police training must amount to "deliberate indifference"
to the rights of people with whom the police come into contact with for
section 1983 liability to exist. 78 The training program must be closely
connected to the ultimate injury."' The Court found this "deliberate indifference" approach the most consistent with Monell.80
Justice White noted that a lesser standard of fault would expose
municipalities to unprecedented liability under section 1983. This would lead

73. Id. Justice White, writing for the majority, commented that this inquiry has
been a difficult one for the Court, leaving the Court deeply divided in the cases
decided after Monell. See infra notes 108-154 for a discussion of these cases.
74. Id. at 386 n.5. Again, the theories on which supervisory liability may be
predicated will often overlap. For more discussion of the unconstitutional "policy or
custom" theory of supervisory liability, see infra notes 101-154 and accompanying
text.
75. Id. at 387. Justice White noted that all of the circuits that had considered the
issue had also allowed liability on the failure to train theory, and that six members of
the current Court had joined opinions that endorsed section 1983 liability on this
theory. Id. at 387 n.6.
76. See supra note 57.
77. Id. at 388. Justice White noted that some circuits found "gross negligence"
in a city's failing to train its employees sufficient to impose section 1983 liability,
while others required the city to exhibit "deliberate indifference" toward the
constitutional rights of the allegedly injured party. Id. See supra notes 62-63 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the degree of negligence necessary in personal
capacity suits. Justice White may have been referring to some of these cases.
78. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. The Court mentioned only police training.
Failure to train cases dealing with prison officials would probably also be subjected
to the same standard.

79. Id. at 391.
80. Id. at 388-89. The Monell Court said that the municipality should be liable
under section 1983 only where its policies are the "moving force [behind] the
constitutional violation." Id. at 389 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
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to de facto respondeatsuperiorliability for municipalities, a basis of liability
rejected in Monell.1 Finally, wrote Justice White, a lower standard of fault
would put the federal courts in the position of second-guessing employee
training programs. The federal courts are ill-suited for this purpose, and such
a role would implicate serious federalism questions.82 For all these reasons,
the Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case
for a new trial consistent with the "deliberate indifference" standard.8 3
C. Failureto Act on Repeated Constitutional Violations
A second theory of supervisory liability under section 1983 is to allege
that the constitutional violation should have come to the attention of the
supervisor. This constructive notice often occurs when there has been a
pattern of violations.84
In Fundiller v. Cooper City,' the plaintiff sued the city, the mayor,
officials in the police department, and eleven police officers. The plaintiff
was a participant in a narcotics transaction and was shot by an undercover
police officer.86 The district court dismissed the federal counts for failure to
state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
a claim had been stated against the police officer who wounded the plaintiff,
the other officers who took part in the arrest, the city, and the city's public
safety director.8 7 With regard to the supervisory liability of the public safety
director, the court of appeals held that the complaint did state a claim because
it alleged a pattern of excessive force about which the director should have

81. Id. at 391-92. Justice White points out that in every case where section 1983
liability is asserted, the plaintiff will always be able to point to something the city
"could have done" to prevent the violation of constitutional rights. Id.
82. Id. at 392.
83. Id. at 393. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented as to the
remand. They felt that the plaintiff "has not and could not satisfy the fault and
causation requirements we adopt today," and that remand was unnecessary. Id.
84. The "pattern" argument is often very similar to the argument that a
municipality has a "custom" of causing the violation. The "policy or custom" theory
is used to implicate municipalities and supervisory officials who are sued in their
official capacity. For example, suing the mayor or the police chief is, in effect, the
same as suing the municipality itself. This theory is discussed infra notes 101-154 and
accompanying text. Constructive notice is another area where the overlap between
different theories of supervisory liability causes confusion; courts enhance the
confusion by using the theories interchangeably.
85. 777 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1985).

86. Id.'at 1438.
87. Id. at 1443-44.
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known. The complaint also alleged that the director failed to take corrective
steps after he knew about the pattern of excessive force.8
Similarly, in Chapman v. Pickett,8 9 the Seventh Circuit held that
supervisors may be personally liable for failing to act when they have
knowledge of a constitutional violation. 90 In Chapman, an inmate sued
prison officials. 9' The court stated that "the knowledge that is required [for
personal liability] is not only that a constitutional deprivation exists but also
that the supervisor's personal action is necessary to set it right." 92 The court
found that the prison official had this knowledge. 93
Several courts of appeals have held that the supervisory official must be
more than merely negligent for section 1983 liability to exist. The Seventh
Circuit held in Rascon v. Hardiman94 that mere negligence was insufficient
to hold the executive director of a prison liable The court said that the
plaintiff must show that the official knowingly, willfully, or recklessly caused
the deprivation by either his action or by his failure to act.95
Another related issue arising in section 1983 cases is whether the incident
giving rise to the case was a single, isolated incident, or whether it was part
of a pattern of incidents. 96 In Wilson v. Attaway97 the three plaintiffs were
wrongfully arrested during a race riot and exposed to unconstitutional

88. Id. at 1443. The court also found that the plaintiff's allegations against the
municipality, if true, would be permissible under Monell. Id. at 1442-43.
89. 801 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 484 U.S. 807 (1987).
90. Id. at 918.
91. The plaintiff alleged that his rights were violated when he was placed in
segregated confinement for refusing, on religious grounds, to clean pork off of food
trays. Id. at 913.
92. Id. at 918.
93. Id.
94. 803 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986). A widow sued the executive director and the
corrections officer of the county correctional facility where her husband had been held.
The husband had allegedly been beaten while at the facility. Id. at 271.
A jury found for the plaintiff as against all defendants. The court of appeals held
that the verdict against the executive director could not stand and that a new trial was
required because the liability of the officer, who was not alleged to have personally
inflicted any injury on the inmate was not fairly represented to the jury. Id. at 275-76.
95. Id. at 274. See also Wilson v. City of N. Little Rock, Ark., 801 F.2d 316,
322-23 (8th Cir. 1986) (police chief must have either personally ordered or breached
a duty to supervise roadblock alleged to have caused constitutional violation; mere
negligence not enough).
96. In this case, the theory may be intertwined with a failure to supervise theory
or with an unconstitutional policy theory. See infra notes 101-154 and accompanying
text.
97. 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4

14

Weinman: Weinman: Supervision Liability
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY

1055

conditions in the county jail. 98 The plaintiffs sued several defendants,
including the mayor. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the trial court's grant of a
directed verdict in favor of the mayor because the violations were the result
of a single inciderit and not a history of abuse.99 The court noted that a
causal connection between the mayor's actions and the deprivation of rights
could be established only where a history of widespread prior abuse puts the
official on notice of the need for improved training or supervision."°
V. SUING SUPERVISORS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY
A. Overview

Officials may be liable in their official capacities only when "execution
of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury." ''
The Supreme Court has narrowed the contours of
the "policy or custom" basis for supervisory liability since Monell.'" The
plaintiff must now meet several general requirements when suing supervisors
in their official capacity.
First, proving that one unconstitutional incident occurred is usually not
enough to prove that the municipality is engaged in an unconstitutional policy
or custom." 3 According to the Seventh Circuit, "proof of a single incident
of unconstitutional activity is not enough to impose lability under Monell,
unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing,
unconstitutional policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policy

98. The plaintiffs were African-Americans; the defendants were Caucasian. The
incident arose out of a protest rally held in Georgia by African-Americans. Violence

broke out at the rally. "Witnesses for the plaintiffs testified that whites attacked the
blacks and that the.., police participated in the attack." Id. The defendants denied
these allegations. Id. at 1233.
99. Id. at 1242.

100. Id. at 1241-42. See also Marachant v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 741 F.2d
201, 204-05 (8th Cir. 1984) (police chief could not be held liable for injuries suffered
by pretrial detainee resulting from failure to give detainee her prescribed medicine
during incarceration; improper dispensing of medicine was an isolated incident about
which chief had no knowledge).
101. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
102. The Court in Monell stated that it would not address the parameters of
"policy or custom," but would "leave the decision for another day." Id. at 695.

103. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1987); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803
F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986).
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maker." 1" Second, the plaintiff must prove that the unconstitutional policy
actually caused the injury.0s The plaintiff must establish an "affirmative
link" between her deprivation of rights and the "adoption" of a plan or policy
by the supervisors "showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct."'' 1 The plaintiff proves the causal link, according to the Ninth Circuit,
if she shows the supervisor "set in motion a 'series of acts by others which the
actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the
constitutional injury. ' ' 07
B. City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik: The Supreme Court'sRecent
Discussion of Official-Capacity Cases
Suing supervisors in their official capacity is, in effect, the same as suing
the governmental entity directly. The supervisors act as agents for the
governmental entityYu As a result, a discussion of the current status of
municipal liability under section 1983 is necessary. In the 1980's the
Supreme Court handed down several opinions examining the "policy or
custom" issue; these opinions show definite divisions within the Court."°
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnikil° summarizes the Court's recent commentary
on the matter.
In Praprotnik,a city employee who was transferred and later laid off
filed suit against the city claiming that he had been penalized for filing a
complaint with the city's Civil Service Commission."' The Court reviewed

104. Rascon, 803 F.2d at 274 (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 822 (1985)).
105. Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986).
106. Id. at 1370. Note the language concerning "authorization or approval." This
language usually connotes individual liability, not official capacity liability.
107. Id. at 1370 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).
108. See Geter v. Willie, 842 F.2d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1988).
109. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Springfield
v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987); Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, reh. denied, 476
U.S. 1154 (1986); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
110. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
111. The plaintiff, an architect, was a management-level employee in one of the
city's agencies who successfully appealed a temporary suspension to the city's Civil
Service Commission. Id. at 116. Two years after the appeal, he was transferred to a

clerical position in another agency; he was terminated from the job one year later. Id.
A jury found the city liable under section 1983 on the theory that the plaintiff's first

amendment rights had been violated by the retaliatory actions taken after his appeal
to the Commission. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the jury had
"implicitly determined that [plaintiff's] layoff from [the agency] was brought about by
an unconstitutional city policy." Id. at 116-17.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
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the Monell decision, noting that governmental bodies can only act through
people, and that the governments should be held responsible only when "their
official policies cause their employees to violate another person's constitutional rights."" 2 This interpretation follows from the language in the statute that
provides liability when a government "subjects [a person], or causes [that
person] to be subjected," to a deprivation of constitutional rights. This
language sets out a causation requirement that would be incompatible with
vicarious liability."
The Court noted that since Monell, it had considered cases involving
isolated acts by government officials and employees. In these cases, the Court
found that an unconstitutional governmental policy could be "inferred from a
single decision taken by the highest officials responsible for setting policy in
that area of the government's business."" 4 In contrast, the Court noted, "we
officer cannot, without
have held that an unjustified shooting by a police
l5
more, be thought to result from official policy."
The Court then discussed when a decision made on a single occasion
would be enough to establish municipal policy. Justice O'Connor, writing for
a plurality of the Court," 6 recalled Pembaur v. Cincinnati.n" 7 In
Pembauer, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion announced several guiding
principles for analysis of municipal liability. First, a municipality may only
be liable under section 1983 for acts for which the municipality is itself
responsible. The municipality must have officially sanctioned the act.
Second, only those municipal officials who have "final policymaking
authority" can subject the government to liability for their actions. Third,
whether the official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law.
Finally, the action alleged to be an unconstitutional policy must have been
taken by officials authorized under state law to make policy in that area of the
city's business." 8
Justice O'Connor clarified these principles. She emphasized that the
identification of policy-making officials is a question of state law. States have
wide latitude in choosing forms of local government, and as a result of local

112. Id. at 121.
113. Id. at 122.
114. Id. at 123. Note that a single illegal action cannot be a policy, but a single
decision by an official with authority to make policy can be a "policy" under Monell.
115. Id.
116. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia joined.

Justice Brennan wrote a

concurring opinion in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens
dissented. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision.
117. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
118. Praprotnik,485 U.S. at 123.
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preferences, there are many distinct forms of local government. Whether a
specific official has responsibility for making policy decisions in a given area
of the local government's business is not a question of fact for the federal
courts. State law will always direct a federal court to the official or body who
has policymaking authority. Even though state law will not always be
perfectly clear, Justice O'Connor saw no more difficulty here for the federal
courts in interpreting state law than in any other context.11 9 The plurality
held the following:
A federal court would not be justified in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law
purports to put it. And certainly there can be no justification for giving a
jury the discretion to determine which officials are high enough in the
actions can be said to represent a decision of the
government that their
120
government itself.
Justice O'Connor pointed out that the result would be indistinguishable
from respondeat superior liability if the mere exercise of discretion by an
employee could give rise to a constitutional violation. Conversely, section
1983 could not serve its intended purpose if a city's lawful policymakers
could insulate the city from liability simply by delegating their policymaking
authority to other employees."'
Justice O'Connor offered some principles to guide federal courts in
dealing with this dilemma of municipal policymakers avoiding constitutional
liability by delegating their authority. First, any attempt by government
officials to insulate themselves from liability for unconstitutional policies
would be addressed under the "custom" aspect of section 1983 liability.
Although not expressly authorized by municipal policy, the plaintiff may
prove that the unconstitutional practice is "so permanent and well settled as
to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law."'2
Second, O'Connor emphasized that the authority to make municipal
policy is the authority to make final policy. "When an official's discretionary
decisions are constrained by policies not of that official's making, those
policies, rather than the subordinate's departures from them, are the act of the

119. Id. at 125-26. In the instant case, the Court examined the St. Louis City

Charter to find that the mayor and aldermen were authorized to adopt ordinances
relating to personnel administration. The Charter authorized the Civil Service
Commission to prescribe rules for the administration and enforcement of personnel
matters. The Court found that action by any of the above parties would be attributable
to the city itself. id.
120. Id. at 126.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 127.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
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municipality." 1" Thus, when the municipality's authorized policymakers
have the power to review a subordinate's decision, they have retained the
power to examine the subordinate's conduct to make sure it conforms with
their policies. If the policymakers approve the subordinate's decision and the
basis for that decision, the municipality would be responsible for the approval
because the policymakers' decision is final.124 When policymaking officials
simply go along with decisions made by their subordinates, however, they do
not delegate to them the authority to make policy. This is especially true
when the subordinate's decision reflects a retaliatory or otherwise wrongful
motive. In such a situation, the purposes of section 1983 are not furthered by
treating the subordinate's decision as if it were an indication of the municipality's policy., s
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Marshall."~ He saw the issue as whether respondent's supervisor
possessed the authority to establish final employment policy for the city of St.
Louis. If so, the city could be held liable under section 1983 for the
supervisor's allegedly unlawful decision to transfer plaintiff to a dead-end
job. 27 Justice Brennan concluded that the supervisor did not have final
policymaking authority.1 28 Justice Brennan believed, however, that the
plurality's formulation of municipal liability was too narrow and would lead
municipalities to insulate themselves from liability for the acts of a great
number of actual municipal policymakers. 29

123. Id.

124. Id. In the instant case, the plaintiff never contended that anyone in the city
government promulgated an unconstitutional policy. He argued that his appeal to the
Civil Service Commission angered his superiors, that new supervisors in a new
administration chose to retaliate against him two years later by transferring him to
another agency, and that this transfer was part of a scheme that caused his termination
a year and a half later. Id. The Court noted that even if the accusations were true, the
plaintiff said nothing about the actions of those whom the law established as makers
of municipal policy regarding personnel administration: the mayor, aldermen, and
Civil Service Commission. Id. at 126-28.
The court of appeals mistakenly concluded, according to Justice O'Connor, that
officials who had the authority to effect transfers and layoffs were municipal
policymakers. Id. at 127-28. The Supreme Court found that such officials did not
have the authority to establish employment policy for the city with respect to transfers
and layoffs; the City Charter expressly stated that the Civil Service Commission had
these duties. Id. at 128-29.
125. Id. at 130.
126. Id. at 131-32 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 132.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Although state law should be a starting point for determining whether a
municipal official has policymaking authority, Justice Brennan believed that
the fact finder must ultimately ascertain where the authority actually resides,
not "where the applicable law purports to put it."" 0 Justice Brennan

considered the "custom or usage" doctrine inadequate to compensate for a rule
that leaves the identification of policymakers exclusively to state statutory
law.ul State statutes often have little bearing on the issue of whether a city
has delegated de facto policymaking authority to a given official.'
Justice
Brennan also disagreed with the plurality's "narrow and overly rigid view" of
when an official's policymaking authority is "final."' 3
He noted that
supervising officials may, as a matter of practice, never invoke their power to
review the decisions of subordinates. In those situations, the subordinates'34
decisions are "in effect the final municipal pronouncement on the subject.'
The circuits that have considered the matter accepted the Praprotnik
plurality's approach without much discussion or dissent. All agree that courts
must look at state law to determine who is a final policymaker. 1 5 The Sixth

130. Id. at 143. Justice Brennan noted that the plurality could state no authority
for the "startling" proposition that state statutory law should provide the exclusive
means to ideiitify municipal policy-makers. "We have never suggested that municipal
liability should be determined in so formalistic and unrealistic a fashion." Id. Note
that Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Monell.
131. Id. at 143-44.
132. Id. at 144. Brennan saw a "gaping hole" in the plurality's construction of
section 1983. He gave the example of a city practice of delegating final policy-making
authority to a subordinate or mid-level official. The delegation itself would be
constitutional. An isolated unconstitutional act by an official so authorized would not
amount to a municipal "custom or usage." Brennan felt that such an isolated act
should give rise to municipal liability under Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469
(1986); yet, such a case would fall through the plurality's construction because state
statutory law would not identify the official as a municipal policymaker. Praprotnik,
485 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 143-44.
134. Id. at 144-45. Justice Brennan concluded that a section 1983 plaintiff should
be able to have a jury decide whether a given official has "final" decision-making
power, "for the law is concerned not with the niceties of legislative draftsmanship but
with the realities of municipal decisionmaking, and any assessment of a municipality's
actual power structure is necessarily a factual ad practical one." Id.
135. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hardin County, Ky., 908 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1990);
Crowley v. Prince George's County, Md., 890 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1989); Worsham v.
City of Pasadena, Tex., 881 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1989); Gobel v. Maricopa County,
Ariz., 867 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1989); Wulf v. City of Wichita, Kan., 883 F.2d 842
(10th Cir. 1989); Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1989); Bordanaro v.
McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 75 (1989); Baez v.
Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1014 (1988); Williams v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/4
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Circuit followed the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of who is a final
policymaker in Johnson v. Hardin County, Kentucky.136 In that case, a
former prisoner sued the jailor and the county for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 37 The court upheld the verdict against the
jailor but set aside the verdict against the county."' Although the jailor had
authority to make medical policy decisions at the prison, the court found that
the jailor did not have statutory authority to make medical policy decisions for
the entire county." 9 The Sixth Circuit found the plurality's approach
"particularly reasonable" because many governmental officials have the
discretion to make some final decisions without the approval of those who
have the authority to set policy on that subject matter. 4 ' The Sixth Circuit
found that any other outcome would result in municipal liability for "every
discretionary decision of every municipal employee, a result rejected by the
[Supreme] Court."''
The Eighth Circuit has taken a broader view. 4 2 In Williams v. But4
ler, ' the Eighth Circuit upheld municipal liability under Praprotnik,stating
that the city of Little Rock, Arkansas may be held liable for the unconstitutional discharge of a municipal court clerk by a municipal judge. 44

Butler, 863 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989).
136. Johnson, 908 F.2d at 1280.
137. Id. at 1280-81.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1286-87. The court referred to language in Justice O'Connor's opinion
stating that "when an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not
of that official's making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's departures from
them are the act of the municipality." Id.
140. Id. at 1285-87.
141. Id. at 1286-87. The jailor did have final policy- making authority over his
prison according to Kentucky statute, therefore alleviating many problems of imposing
municipal liability. Cf. infra notes 141-150 and accompanying text, where courts
found the final policy-making authority to exist.
142. See also Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 793-94 (11th Cir. 1989). The
Eleventh Circuit also took a broader view of final decision-making policy in a factual
situation similar to Johnson.
143. 863 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1988).
144. Id. at 1399. The court had upheld the liability of Little Rock twice before,
but both times the decision had been remanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court remanded in 1986 so that the Eighth Circuit could reconsider the case in light
of Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). The Eighth Circuit's decision
on remand was vacated for reconsideration in light of City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik,
485 U.S. 112 (1988).
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The court of appeals characterized the Praprotnikholding in terms of

how much authority was delegated to the official.'45 The court noted that
a "very fine line" exists between the delegation of final policymaking
authority, for which the municipality may be held liable, and giving
discretionary authority tothat official, for which the municipality may not be
held liable.'4 The court found the distinction to lie in the amount of
authority the authorized policymakers retain.14 7 Praprotnik delivered a
"clear message" that when the authorized policymakers retain a right to review
the decisions of the subordinate, there cannot be municipal liability because
the delegation of authority is not absolute. In contrast, when there is an
absolute delegation of authority to a subordinate with no right of review by
the authorized policymakers, the municipality may be held liable for that
official's decisions. 48 The court found that the city delegated final
policymaking authority to the municipal judge for the hiring and firing of his
staff. The city admitted that the judge had sole authority to discharge clerks
and determine the clerks' working conditions. 149 The city's Personnel
Policy Statement placed municipal court employees under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the judge for whom they worked.1 50 The court held that the
city granted absolute authority to the judge with regard to employment policy
in his court, and that this grant of absolute authority would support municipal
liability under Praprotnik.ui
The Williams decision should be compared to the Sixth Circuit's Johnson
decision, where municipal liability would not always exist when the
subordinate's action was unreviewable. The Sixth Circuit would look further
to determine whether the subordinate's decision was "constrained" by a
"policy not of that official's making."15' The Eighth Circuit would only
look at whether the subordinate's decision was subject to review.15 3 It will
remain for the Supreme Court to further clarify when an official has "final"
policymaking authority.5

145. Williams, 863 F.2d at 1399-1400.
146. Id. at 1407.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1402.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1402-03.
152. See supra notes 136-141 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 142-151.
154. In addition, it appears that the question of municipal liability turns on how
a court characterizes the official in relation to the governmental entity. In Johnson,
for instance, the jailor clearly had final authority in that prison for the decisions he
made. The court, however, characterized the jailor's decision-making power relative
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VI. PRACTICE NoTEs
There are several factors the practitioner must keep in mind when dealing
with section 1983 cases. First, the practitioner must take care to allege all
possible bases of liability in the complaint. Given the great number of section

1983 cases, federal courts are likely to require more than the notice pleading
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).155 Although the pleading
may survive the initial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a mere
notice pleading may not be sufficient to allow remand after appeal. For
example, the plaintiff initiates a section 1983 suit suing the supervisor in his
individual and official capacities. Assuming there is no personal involvement
by the supervisor, the plaintiff pleads failure to train as the theory of liability.
If the failure to train theory is rejected on appeal, the appellate court need not
remand the case to see if there was a "custom or policy" of abuse because the
plaintiff did not plead "custom or policy." The appellate court may do this
even when reasonable people would differ as to the facts; that is, the district
court could not have granted summary judgment on the custom or policy issue
had it been pled. 56

This type of action by the courts of appeals clearly runs contrary to the

federal policy of notice pleading. Presumably, under notice pleading, once the
plaintiff sues a supervisor in her official capacity, the official is on notice that

to the whole county. Johnson, 908 F.2d at 1286-87. Since the jailor did not have

final policy- making authority with regard to medical matters for the whole county,
there was not a delegation of policy-making authority sufficient for liability under

Praprotnik. Id. The Eighth Circuit, conversely, characterized the judge's policy
making authority relative to his own chambers in Williams and it upheld liability. Id.
at 1287-89. As a result, the Sixth Circuit took a wide view, while the Eighth Circuit
took a narrower view. Presumably, the Sixth Circuit would not have upheld municipal
liability in Williams because it would have found that the judge had no final authority
to make personnel decisions for all of the municipal courts in Little Rock.
155. FED. R. CIv. PROC. 8(a) deals with claims for relief and states the following:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no
new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the
alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 9 on pleading special matters.
156. See Williams v. Cash, 836 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1988) (no allegation
by plaintiff of policy or custom or of constructive notice; summary judgment granted
against plaintiff); Patton v. Przybyisni, 822 F.2d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 1987) (complaint
inadequate and therefore dismissed).
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the main issue of liability will be whether there is a policy or custom. The
reviewing court should then look for any facts that would support a finding
of a policy or custom, even if the plaintiff did not specifically allege it. Then,
the court would be construing the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.
A second suggestion for practitioners relates to the prayer for damages.
The practitioner should ask for nominal damages in the amount of one dollar
separate from any compensatory or punitive damages. The pleading should
ask for these damages even if no compensatory damages are awarded. The
reason for asking for the nominal damages is that the plaintiff may be awarded
his attorney fees under section 1988 if the plaintiff "prevails" in the section
1983 case. 7 This may occur because in supervisory liability cases, often
the plaintiff will not win any compensatory damages because the plaintiff will
not be allowed to maintain the suit against one or more of the defendants.158
Further, in many cases the plaintiff will not find out that he lost until the case
is decided on appeal. By this stage, the attorneys have worked many hours
on the case. Thus, by asking for the nominal damages, the plaintiff has a
greater chance of "prevailing" and thus being awarded attorney fees under
section 1988.
VII. COMMENT
In the years since Monell, the Supreme Court has narrowed the chance
of recovery for plaintiffs in cases under section 1983. The cases indicate
fewer circumstances where municipal liability will be imposed. Plaintiffs have
a difficult burden of proof in official capacity cases because they must prove
not only how the defendant treated them, but also how the defendant treated
others. Plaintiffs are definitely at a great disadvantage in obtaining this
information.
Even though the road to recovery is a difficult one for section 1983
plaintiffs alleging supervisory liability, plaintiffs can win. Monell could be
read on its face as requiring a strict prohibition against any form of superviso-

ry liability. The contours of the decisions following Monell, however, provide
plaintiffs with a means to hold supervisors liable. Unfortunately, injured
plaintiffs are often left in the hands of the attorney and the judge, neither of
whom may be familiar with the subtleties of the section 1983 cause of action.
Judicial confusion is evident when one reads cases that mix the terminology
and rules of official capacity and individual capacity cases. For example, an

157. See supra note 33 for the rest of the text of 42 U.S.C. section 1988. See
also Carrey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
158. This lack of success would result from the complex rules governing
supervisory liability.
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opinion may examine whether a policy or custom exists when the official is
being sued in an individual capacity. In addition to the confusion produced
by the supervisory liability cases, there are also policy problems resulting from
the current status of section 1983 law. Section 1983 is a blend of tort and
constitutional law. Given the plaintiff's diminished chances of recovering
against supervisors, however, neither the policies of tort law nor constitutional
law are served.
Narrowing the section 1983 plaintiff's chance for recovery does not
further tort law policies. Currently, plaintiffs often receive no compensation
for their injuries. Many section 1983 plaintiffs, especially victims of police
and prison brutality, suffer tangible physical injuries. If these plaintiffs are
not able to sue a party who can afford to pay a judgment, then the plaintiffs
must absorb these costs themselves. Under normal tort law principles,
respondeatsuperior would protect innocent parties from bearing the costs of
their own injury. Under section 1983, however, plaintiffs have no such
protection. This allocation of losses is unsatisfactory.
Also, a plaintiff's section 1983 case has no deterrent effect if a supervisor
or municipality is shielded from liability. One may argue that the price of
litigating the case, in terms of attorney's fees and publicity, deters supervisors
and municipal officers from violating constitutional rights. Additionally, any
large jury award against the municipality would be paid by the taxpayers. It
is clear, however, that a large jury award against a supervisor or municipality
would have a deterrent effect. When supervisors are sued in their personal
capacity, they must pay any damage award individually. A supervisor who
lost a section 1983 personal capacity case would surely be very careful about
future conduct on the job. When the municipality loses a section 1983 case,
the taxpayers pay the award, but they will not continue to pay damage awards
forever. Eventually, the taxpayers will demand the ouster of those municipal
officials responsible for abuses. Another issue related to deterrence is that tort
awards force defendants to increase the safety of their actions to prevent
further suits. If plaintiffs' chances for recovery continue to be diminished,
defendants clearly will have no impetus to reform the way they conduct
themselves.
The policies of constitutional law are more difficult to isolate. Section
1983 is based on the fourteenth amendment Due Process clause, which in turn
comes from the fifth amendment Due Process clause. The overall philosophy
of these clauses is to protect the individual from government. The founders
of this country feared a central government that was too powerful. The
Congress that passed the fourteenth amendment feared state governments that
had become too negligent of civil rights. Thus, one may reasonably conclude
that the constitutional policy behind section 1983 is to protect the individual
from oppression by government and to give the individual a method for
compensation if oppression does occur. Decreasing a plaintiff's chance of
recovery against supervisory officials increases the chance that those officials
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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will deprive people of their constitutional rights. The officials can get away
with misconduct, even oppression, without fear of punishment." 9
Of course, the argument for preventing vicarious liability in section 1983
cases is made in many of the opinions cited in this Comment. Municipal
supervisors cannot be held liable for the action of their employees because to
do so would put too great a risk on the supervisors and on the municipality.
The cost to the municipality would be great and supervisors would be
inhibited from doing their jobs. These arguments are unpersuasive.
Taxpayers pay when the municipality loses a section 1983 case. Taxpayers
also pay when the plaintiff is not allowed to recover in a section 1983 case.
When that plaintiff is disabled as a result of injuries sustained at the hands of
a police officer, and when that plaintiff cannot recover against the supervisor,
the taxpayers often bear the price of that person's use of Medicare or
Medicaid. When an inmate dies in prison from inadequate medical care, the
taxpayers pay social security benefits to the inmate's spouse and children.
Either way, the taxpayers pay. The real question is, "How do we want to
pay?" Many section 1983 victims are not financially able to wage a lengthy
court battle. Clearly, it is better to compensate these victims up front than to
wait until they become dependent on state assistance.
The argument that supervisors will be "chilled" in their official activities
if vicarious liability is allowed in supervisory cases is also unconvincing. The
person who directly caused the injuries is still personally liable for any
damages. Usually this person is not the supervisor; it is the law enforcement
officer on the beat or the prison guard on duty. These people are not
insulated from liability, yet they are still able to perform their jobs. If these
people can do their jobs even though they are constantly threatened with a
lawsuit, so can the supervisors.
Given the current composition of the Supreme Court, one may foresee
that the plaintiffs' chances for recovery under section 1983 will not be
broadened. It may well be that chances for recovery are diminished even
further. The Supreme Court must continue to act on what it perceives to be
Congress' intent in 1871 when Congress originally enacted section 1983.
Accordingly, the solution is for Congress to show a different intent by
amending section 1983.
The best way to amend section 1983 to allow vicarious recovery against
supervisors and municipalities would be to add a new sentence ' specifical-

159. This was precisely Justice Brennan's point in his dissent in the Prapronik
case. He felt that the true policy makers would delegate their policy making authority
to subordinates to insulate themselves from liability. See supra notes 126-130 and
accompanying text.
160. This sentence would be best positioned as the second to last sentence in
section
1983.
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ly allowing respondeatsuperiorliability. The sentence could read as follows:
"This section permits vicarious recovery by the party injured from any
supervisor, employer or governmental entity." The advantage of this type of
change is that it defines Congress' intent regarding respondeatsuperior. The
disadvantage of this type of change is that new terms will be introduced into
the statute, such as "supervisor" and "employer." To prevent the courts from
narrowly interpreting these terms, Congress must define them. For example,
"supervisor" could be defined as "any person who supervises, oversees,
reviews, evaluates, controls, manages or governs the work of another." The
definition must be specific enough to prevent courts from interpreting it
themselves, yet it must be broad enough to include any superior connected
with the tortfeasor, not only those who possess "final decision making power."
This course of action should result in more judgments collectable under
section 1983. The fiscal effect of more damage awards against governmental
entities is hard to estimate. An amended section 1983 could lead to the
development of errors and omissions insurance for public employees. The
taxpayers would have to fund the premiums for such insurance, but surely it
would be more efficient to use taxpayers' money for insurance than for
lengthy trials and later for public welfare for the uncompensated injured
parties. If private physicians and attorneys can afford malpractice insurance,
so can governmental entities.
Congress must reexamine the current status of supervisory liability under
section 1983. The confusing web of Supreme Court cases attempting to
reconstruct the intentions of the men who passed the statute 120 years ago
must be supplanted by a clear statement of Congress' intent today. In view
of the reasons for having a statute like section 1983 in the first place, surely
that intent must be to broaden supervisory liability by allowing respondeat
superiorunder the statute.
SHARI S. WEINMAN
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